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Abstract 
In this work, we undertake the task of laying out some basic considerations towards 
straightening out the foundations of an abstract logical system. We venture to 
explain what theory is as well as what is not theory, to discriminate between the 
roles of truth in theory and in reality, as well as to open the road towards clarifying 
the relationship between theory and the real world. Etymological, cultural and 
conceptual analyses of truth are brought forth in order to reveal problems in modern 
approaches and to set the stage for more consistent solutions. One such problem 
addressed here is related to negation per se, to its asymmetry towards affirmative 
statements and to the essential ramifications of this duality with respect to the 
common perceptual and linguistic aspects of words indicating concepts akin to truth 
in various languages and to attitudes reflected and perpetuated in them and to their 
consequent use in attempted informal or formal logic and its understanding. Finally, 
a case study invoking the causes or “causes” of gravity both clarifies and reinforces 
the points made in this paper. 
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1. Introduction 
At first sight, the title of this paper may seem somewhat redundant; one would think 
that it would suffice to just call it “verification in the sciences”, since theory is 
commonly considered to be an integral part of the scientific field. Or maybe not? 
“Verification in the sciences” could most probably be just another reference to the 
grandiose – save failed – agenda of the Vienna Circle; of course, no matter how hard 
one tried, by bringing up the word “verification” into an epistemologically orientated 
text, a quasi-metaphysical obligation seems to jump forth demanding to pay homage 
to Logical Positivism, which is the spiritual offspring and, at the same time, the 
tombstone of the Viennese Circle. That we will do. However, the core of our approach 
is quite a modern one, since nowadays little attention is paid to the concept of truth per 
se, as well as to its relation to theory and to its critical difference from reality; 
etymological, cultural and conceptual approaches will only assist in making our points 
more transparent. 
Our journey will take us to exploring the very foundation of epistemology, of science 
(in any form) and even of our own private cosmos – since even in “science” there is 
not much that we can do other than project our own world (or should we say thought-
structures) onto the world outside if us (or whatever is out there which we perceive as 
that). By exploring various concepts related to truth, we shall explore the place of 
metaphysical realism, of infinity as well as of zero – this last one both as opposed to 
infinity (infinite vs. infinitesimal) and as the non-coindent antonyms of Truth i.e., 
Falsehood, untruth, lie and the like. Finally, the concept of gravity will pull us back 
into reality. 
 
2. Logical Positivism and logic 
What is very much telling in the case of the Vienna Circle and of its spiritual offspring, 
namely Logical Positivism, is that, rightfully or wrongfully, the names of many 
legendary personalities were linked to it. Mach, Einstein, Schlick, Carnap and others 
were identified with at least some aspect of logical positivism / empiricism (Psillos, 
2007; Papageorgiou, 2015). The reader may have already discovered that e.g. Einstein 
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was a candidate for proselytism, but eventually distanced himself from the cycle’s 
proceedings; however, one cannot help seeing that, one way or another, every major 
figure in science for the best part of the 20th century was measured against the ideas 
of the said cycle. Why is that? 
There must be a systemic reason for such a deviation. We make ourselves clear: 
epistēmē, as it was conceived in classical Greece, was the result of the effort to seek 
truth bypassing the fault of the senses; it was not meant to utilize the then heavily 
underestimated senses towards “finding” the truth. The fervour nowadays to put into 
boosting our senses with billion-dollar equipment would count as nothing less than a 
monstrosity for Greeks who seemed to have been avoiding anything more complex 
than a ruler and a compass in order to do mathematics (Cajori, 1893). What has gone 
wrong? The nucleus of that question is intensified by the very fact that, despite the fall 
of logical empiricism back in the 50’s and the end of its dogma of verification, nobody 
seems to have really abandoned it. Logical empiricism has just been transformed into 
“statistical” empiricism, where something is not of course verified if we observe it, 
but it becomes verified should we observe it frequently – say billions of times, say in 
CERN experiments!  
No matter what we call it, i.e. positivism or empiricism, it is categorized as “logical”. 
But what does that mean other than being related to the modern understanding of logic, 
i.e. symbolic logic, i.e. the mathematical field initially formulated (in terms of 
symbolism) by Frege and Russell and Whitehead (Stoll, 1963)? On the other hand, 
empiricism, as connected to the ideas of Francis Bacon, John Locke and David Hume, 
states that sensory experience is the only valid way of knowing something – therefore, 
the only way of abstaining from value judgements, hence becoming positive. Can that 
then be anything more than applied mathematics? In the classical mathematical point 
of view, though, applied mathematics is the methodology of extending pure theory 
towards forming systematic organizing and descriptive tools for observation, in 
essence with a license to be borrowed as a tool by the sciences. But not only that (as 
it is considered to be a beneficial deed to apply mathematics); logic, even in its most 
basic and intuitive version, bans us from identifying causes with effects (unless some 
one-to-one / “iff” correspondence is shown). 
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All in all, then, we and everybody else along with us ought to realize that the 
theoretical applicable outlook of mathematics and the empiricist theorist course of the 
sciences run in opposite senses: mathematics flow from theory to application, whereas 
the sciences start from observation and try to end up in theoretical schemes. How can 
A be identical to B, if A is sailing East to West while B is drifting West to East? 
That understood and moving along, to the extent that nature and the world exists and 
functions in its own ways by its own means and rules, there are certain norms to 
causality: if phenomenon B is “typically” preceded by phenomenon A in this particular 
temporal sequence (B after A) to an identifiable and significant degree of material 
association and correlation of occurrence, then we can venture to say or suppose that 
the occurrence of A is a (material) cause for B, and that the manifestation of A creates 
or reveals (this distinction staying controversial) a partial mechanism and/or an 
expectation for the occurrence of B; that plus the feeling that if A were absent of 
altered, B proper would be expected to happen differently or not happen at all. 
And, while this nebulous and contingent situation applies to our subjective noting or 
appraisal of something being a cause for or towards something, the situation is indeed 
somewhat better for the statement that something is the cause for something else. The 
meaning is something that something does not / will not / may not / cannot happen 
without. 
No empirical observation could become the foundation of a causal system – let alone 
a theoretical causal system – unless, of course, we are talking about the cause or source 
of an outburst and flow of information, but that really should be a totally different 
thing, not confused with the ontology of entity or fact. But then again, it is a well-
founded and easily demonstrated dogma in epistemology that no phenomenon – a near 
synonym for effect only too often – includes causes. They (causes) are always set by 
us as relevant to our theoretical system, our assumptions, our level of analysis etc. To 
demonstrate that a bit further, let us imagine a scenario of a car-crash on a rainy day. 
What is the cause of the hit bumper of the front car? Any one of the following may be 
said to be the cause, but can also just as easily be refuted (cf. Koutounkos, 2008): 
1. Momentum/inertia. 
2. Driver’s attention. 
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3. Driver’s girlfriend who said she’s breaking up with him. 
4. Rain. 
5. Slippery road. 
6. Bad asphalt quality. 
7. Bumper’s material strength. 
8. Karma. 
On one hand, a verdict about something being a cause here, as in a contributing factor 
to causality, is a different story, which is not what we are looking for here, unless of 
course it is. All that notwithstanding, however, a logical positivist would exclaim that 
we got it all wrong; no matter what the scenario is, we can always have a specific 
theory that it alone (bracketed in a sense) may be verified by observation alone. 
Indeed, the fall of logical empiricism did not come from its failure to accommodate 
such simple phenomena (Quine, 1951); however, it is exactly where we disagree: a 
theory cannot be refuted or validated by reality – let alone by means of observation. 
What is so appealing about observation in the sciences then? Where does it come from 
and what are its consequences? In order to give answers to these questions one must 
examine closer basic truths about truth. We shall see that these attitudes are a direct 
result of a misconception about truth, that truth and theory “exist” at a different level 
from reality and that not all truths are created equal (truth, veritas, alētheia etc.). 
 
3. The truth about truth 
The authors of this paper expect nothing less of a new scientific revolution (or at least 
a humbler paradigm shift) when sciences start using truth, truthfully. So, let's get on 
with it! 
Mathematical and logical truths are about the design of building arguments, structures 
and systems, making sense of their pattern or layout, combination, arrangement, order, 
all that towards reaching conclusions, in the affirmative or in the negative, regardless 
of their semantic content. That may be a material of reality in the sciences, but quite 
outside mathematics and logic. Besides, in all languages, truth or Latin veritas or 
Greek alētheia also has a second associated meaning, which is the antonym of a lie, 
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as in the expression telling the truth; this is not the same as reality or Latin realitas or 
Greek prāgmatikotēs, i.e. rapport to the imprints of things as they actually do exist and 
function in the world. It is really a question, worth contemplating, why two concepts 
that are so dissimilar become confused and identified in the minds of so many people. 
The true issues in mathematics are things like definitional aptness, elegance, 
decidability, consistency, completeness, clarity vs. ambiguity, systemic coordination, 
theoretical productivity. None of these totally abstract features touch upon things like 
reality, concrete features regarding the material world, nature, physics or metaphysics. 
Truth, as it appears in logic and mathematics, is abstract and regards scheme of train 
of thought; it has no bearing to meaning or reference to the world. Telling something 
like “it is”, logical concepts as if… then…, therefore, contradiction, equal, set, subset, 
and/or, for all, one, five, plus, equals, unit, longer, ratio, infinity etc. are not material 
of materialism or naturalism, metaphysical or otherwise. 
For the rest, one is totally welcome to check the sciences. But, there, logic and 
mathematics serve as abstract borrowed modeling devices towards applications and 
descriptions. They do not “exist” or “reside” somewhere; so, they lie outside the 
administrative realm of materialism and naturalism and anything of the sort. 
There have already been efforts to “track the truth” related to the observation of reality 
(Nozick, 1981). Tracking the truth may increase its chances at success when someone 
tracks its signifier. The etymological variations of “truth” in various languages – i.e. 
languages that have played some role in the sciences – is quite telling about the 
perception surrounding it from corresponding cultures. From the following 
examination it will be made clear that the elementary difference between truth and 
reality is just the tip of the iceberg; what lies hidden underneath the surface is the really 
hot stuff. 
Inter-translatability has been widely discussed among philosophers and it has been 
argued that it would be wrong to assume that meaning cannot be transferred between 
different languages by means of their signifiers – even at extreme cases (cf. Davidson, 
1984). This is a conclusion which we shall not be attacking by any means; however, 
it is just as justified to take it for granted that the meaning of different words generally 
referring to the same notion ought to be identified. On the contrary, much as it is 
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possible to explain their differences in the languages where they originate (such as 
English in our own present discussion right now), the words themselves may suddenly 
exhibit themselves as carrying strikingly different meanings – such as the words 
epistēmē and science, as we have shown elsewhere. 
In the beginning there was alētheia – in Greek. Etymologically, it means “not to miss 
something / anything (significant or obvious)”. Latin veritas (cf. the common verb to 
verify) derives from verus, "true", and that has indeed the same root as, say, German 
Wahrheit; that comes from Middle High German wār, wǣre, from Old High German 
wār, wāri; both of them, then, come from PIE root *were-os (trusted, trustworthy), 
conceivably ultimately related to proto-root *wər meaning to rise up; it may be 
revealing, though, that all the different Scandinavian Germanic languages use a variety 
of different words from different roots for adjectives suggesting this meaning; and that 
reveals that the necessity in these languages for a concept in this direction is very 
recent. English truth, one among them, together with abstract noun and verb trust, 
comes from another Germanic abstract noun *treuwitho, from Proto-Germanic 
treuwaz "having or characterized by good faith”, related to German treu, from PIE 
*drew-o-; further on, this is a suffixed form of the PIE root *deru-, “be firm, solid, 
steadfast”, related to Latin adjective durus = hard. The Slavic counterparts are 
inherited from Old East Slavic правьда (pravĭda), from Proto-Slavic *pravьda, 
derived from Proto-Slavic *pravъ (compare пра́вый / právyj) plus a standard 
structural suffix. Contrary to the Germanic branch, all Slavic languages, exhibiting 
features of a dialectal continuum, share this common root, which possibly has its 
ultimate origin in the same root as Greek and Latin adverb / prepositions πρό / præ = 
forward / before, suggesting once more seeing clearly that which lies in front of us. 
Now, one may put forth the objection that etymology just follows the history of the 
signifier and that the technical meaning may be completely different – isn’t Ebola (the 
name of the horrific disease) etymologically quite irrelevant to the disease – to any 
disease? Ebola, also commonly known by its indigenous name Legbala, is the 
headstream of the Mongala River, a tributary of Congo River in the north of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. So, why bother tracking the various etymological 
origin of “truths”?  
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The making of the word truth is no accident and has been deliberately done in a certain 
way according to what each culture ventures to express through it. There are many 
characteristic examples, such as Schuld, the German word for debt; yet in German 
Schuld also means blame and guilt. However, its cognate in English means an 
obligation regarding something that is due to be done; that is not so different from 
Greek, where χρέος means debt and duty and service, with an etymology derived from 
χρή (necessity) yet linked to verb χρήομαι = to use, noun χρῆσις = usage and adjective 
χρήσιμος = useful. How can anyone miss the cultural significance of such usages as a 
historical witness of how ideas function and evolve and even change within the 
creation, evolution, continuity and transition and sometimes conversions in cultures? 
Truth and all related or “related” concepts are indeed full of cultural connotations 
which can be accessed by means of their etymological tracing and anatomy, since it is 
exactly this kind of “reverse engineering” that tells us how these notions are conceived 
in the first place and treated subsequently – and consequently. And it can be quite 
presumptuous to assume that “translating” the term from one language can be an all-
preserving and non-corrupting tautology.  
 
4. The logic of logic 
When it comes to theoretical mathematics, there is a very widespread fallacy lurking 
here. 
The more abstract something is, the less concrete factual information it contains, 
known in semantics as “significand” (> Latin passive participle present = signified): 
the specimen “my dog”, an actual being, contains a greatly more mass of precise 
significand that the category “mammal” with its common features, which is an 
abstractive classification and grouping. On the other hand, my dog is not only a 
mammal; she is also one (1). What does “one” mean on the level of specific factual 
information, in general and/or as used in this particular referential case? How much 
“information” does it contain regarding my dog? Not much, indeed! 
When we reach theoretical mathematics, par excellence mathematical logic and then 
methodologically whatever is stemming from it, we have actually exhausted the entire 
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course to all-inclusion, generalization and abstraction, and there is zero significand 
left. Pure mathematics is a mental discipline that means nothing really, in or about the 
world and, as such, it is a methodological construction consecrated by its sole desired 
virtues of internal consistency and completeness and, to the degree where it is used in 
applications, thrives on the sole merits of i. its interpretative power as void design, ii. 
its theoretical fertility, i.e. its abilities and slacks towards generating many theorems 
rather than procuring a limited number and exhausting its capacities fast and, 
surprisingly to non-mathematicians, its elegance, an aesthetic choice particular to the 
trade. Mutatis mutandis, it resembles a beautiful crossword puzzle in a magazine, 
which has no real “existence” as an entity besides what it tells us about itself and what 
rules it follows which are figurative and unreal and how nice and to-the-point and 
imaginative it looks and sounds. That is what truth means and has no a priori 
association with realities, facts or perceptions. As a result, it cannot possibly have 
anything to do with beliefs, creeds, laws, conventions, theses or anything that means 
anything at all. Logic, seeking the truth in this context, is totally concerned with the 
pattern of putting down and correlating statements via self-contained invented and 
accepted figurative rules, and with the validity of inference by way of tautology of 
outputs to inputs, not at all with their content, i.e. with what they state. 
Therefore, given all this as it is, no one “believes” or “accepts” or “questions” or 
“rejects” pure mathematics on the basis of scientific or philosophical considerations; 
and axioms do not describe or postulate laws. The essence of turning to and addressing 
and raising expectations from the axiomatic / theorematic realm is this question / 
proposal: “what if we treated our statements and data in this fashion, mobilizing these 
considerations and reaching conclusions as conducted by this structure if it is selected 
to be exercised as a technique?”, regardless of what all this says. An objection to an 
axiomatic point of view, or course of action, is an objection to a schematic focus, a 
way of treating demonstration as in “I don’t like your ‘what if?’”; the answer is “be 
my guest and change my ‘what if?’, then, with another one of your liking, and see 
where it gets you”; i.e. switch axiomatic system, put in and take out whatever you 
think and we shall see what happens a. in its theoretical virtue, b. in its applicability, 
wherever one had hoped for the new setup to be applied, c. its relevance to the wider 
horizons of human knowledge and d. to it elegance. That is all. Mathematics is in the 
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mind; it is not mundane or empirical; it is neither physics nor any other reality-
describing science; it is internal and mental, not external and sensory; it is the 
intellectual conception and processing, not the empirical intake of stimulus and 
information. 
Given all this, the Platonic point of view regarding mathematics and alētheia (the 
authentic Greek term which as it turns out by virtue of what we have set out above is 
typically poorly and incompletely and culture-specifically translated as veritas in Latin 
and as truth in English and as Wahrheit in German and as правда in Russian) reflects 
its genuine Greek etymology (literally meaning, in fact, something that cannot be 
missed): it’s all about an ideal way of considering and checking mental images, 
capitally archetypal ones, and the criteria behind their specifications and groupings. 
As already stated above, it has nothing to do with creeds, attitudes, ideologies, facts, 
realities, or indeed with explanations; it is a good intellectual void scenario pattern; it 
is not a vision of the world and of its objects and its ways. 
A note of caution. Pure theoretical abstract mathematics is not a language or a 
methodology either. Mathematics produces language and can be used as a 
methodology by the sciences and arts and crafts, a posteriori. Neither of these 
unfortunate assertions, typically only too often coming from and encountered in the 
sciences, are acceptable here; they even remind us of modern ethical stances about 
individuality: I am who I am, not what my observer and user describe me as and what 
they use me for; I am not determined as being somebody else’s instrument, or even as 
my own agent; these phrases are extraneous, irrelevant and offensive. 
For logic, in its elementary essence, truth must ideally be broken down to individual 
elemental cases; and its definite, absolute, non-relative, non-ambiguous, non-
probabilistic, non-proportional, non-cumulative, non-survey, non-statistical substance 
may only be conceived in its most essential minimalistic form: simply as a valence, as 
a 1-0 state, as a YES-NO dilemma, which is its key feature and, alas, the source of its 
major perceived applied or usage-connected weakness. Whenever anything more than 
that is (nonchalantly? suspiciously?) inserted into logic, suddenly its relationship to 
reality becomes inevitable – soon we cannot help following the path of “logical 
empiricism” (strictly literally contradiction in terms, as logos means thought and/or 
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speech, therefore it does NOT refer to environment or reality) and indulge in trying to 
find truth in reality. But that is a lie; or isn’t it? 
This is where an inevitable question arises out of the lips of simple yet demanding 
users of theory: does T, logical truth, really suggest something necessarily true, or 
something just possibly or conceivably or perhaps true? First and foremost, it depends 
whether one is talking about a statistical survey of several statements, or strictly about 
individual core true-false yes-no statements. So where, again, is the Boolean 
distinction between a core statement (isomorphic to an element or member) and a 
coherent sequence of inter-related statements, such as an organized theory (isomorphic 
to a set)? Where indeed? 
Moving right along, though and pretending that that structural shortage is not there, 
what is the verdict on the main question? Well, the verdict is that the theory herself 
will not tell us what it means, because the theory does not mean a thing. We are the 
ones deciding which theory to pick in order to organize our concepts and syllogisms, 
according to what we need and what it says. To that end, we take propositional 
calculus, look at the theorems, apply a test of giving this and then that meaning, and 
see and decide whether we are satisfied in our quest of investing our expectation; if 
we are satisfied, we keep the model for as long as we deem that it suits us; or else we 
drop it. So, before we postpone this discussion for a more specific occasion, we may 
try: 
i. T is employed as meaning necessarily true and F as meaning necessarily false; 
ii. T is employed as meaning conditionally true and F as meaning conditionally 
false; 
And then we may put the dilemma to a test, NOT to see what the theory says, but if 
and how we are going to employ it. Crash test? Lydian stone? This then will be left 
for a next time. But let us bear in mind that then we shall have to also test applicability 
and usability for the following two: 
iii.  ¬T is employed as meaning necessarily not true and ¬F as meaning necessarily 
not false; 
iv. ¬T is employed as meaning conditionally not true and ¬F as meaning 
conditionally not false. 
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And, though pairwise uniform is better, one may introduce the test to more 
investigating semantics regarding negation such as necessarily not and conditionally 
not etc., checking whether that is useful or not, which it probably isn’t, but it would 
not hurt to check, would it? For instance, as a teaser, what do we make of / how do 
we apply / what do we do with / how do we proceed with / what do we make of this 
standard proved theorem Ⱶ: F→T? So, now what? necessarily false implies (also) 
necessarily true? Perhaps false implies (also) perhaps true? Which one, where, why, 
how come and to what end? 
The next crucial question is whether we may be tempted to change the axioms. Well, 
why not? But we should make totally sure that the new axioms work better with our 
new explicit criteria which we should be able to identify, understand, rationalize, 
explain, introduce and give ample convincing reasons for them. And, if we do intend 
to push a motion towards abandoning propositional / statement calculus in favour of 
our new formulation, or, which is much more daring, REFORMING propositional / 
statement calculus in the direction in which we point, that is really-really big. Do we 
have enough reasons and initiative so as to intend to undertake such a potentially 
sacrilegious task? Maybe we do; yet, in any case, whether we do or not, we do have 
every right to do. Or are we being agents provocateurs in stating this statement about 
this endeavour of ours towards “level-0” logic? Are we telling the truth or are we 
telling lies? Necessary ones or conditional ones? 
 
5. The truth about lies 
One ought to wonder about the semantic meaning of truth by also contemplating the 
nature of its opposite(s) in usage and beyond. To get started, then, what is the antonym 
of truth? is there just one or are there more? 
Indeed, there are the notions of a lie, of a falsehood and maybe even of something 
wrong or mistaken. Do all of these mean the same as one another? Not at all. Apart 
from mere semantics, there is even an ethical distinction among them. One may be at 
fault because they didn’t know any better; but to tell a lie is a conscious and, in general, 
unethical act, as in a deliberate misrepresentation of what the subject knows or trusts 
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as true. There are cases such as when a potentially violent drunk friend is asking for 
his gun; it may be more ethical to lie to him that we cannot find it, rather than giving 
it to him. The question, therefore, is this: should our concept of truth express the 
reverse of its diverse opposites? Or just of one of them? And which one would that be 
and why and when and when not? 
It is much more parsimonious in terms of total assumptions needed to just accept that 
we do accept one – or both – of two cases: either truth with the widest possible range 
of meanings, or truth with no meaning at all: “truth” with no meaning at all, a valence, 
a typical correspondence between the “Boolean” number 1 and the lexeme “truth”. 
That kind of truth is a one-way decision for theory and epistēmē, where no significand 
is permitted to enter. In the sciences, however, the widest possible meaning of truth 
must be accepted, since meaning itself is the desideratum there. If necessary, then, one 
should re-train one’s understanding of things in order to conceive a theoretical truth 
free of meaning and therefore devoid of sentimental connections. Axiomatic systems, 
as we set them, have the intrinsic value “truth”, or “1”. As we argued earlier in this 
text, the criteria towards their evaluation are fullness, consistency, theoretical 
productivity and elegance (cf. Dimitrakopoulos, 2007). Anything that can boil down 
to an identification with them is automatically true; anything else is not true; or is it 
perhaps false? or not? Or are we telling lies? Or could it be, perhaps, undecidable? Or 
are we pushing into the “unpushable”? Why would we want to do that? Or can’t we 
help it? Wait… are we lost already? And does getting lost have any connection to not 
accepting the truth of the axioms? Or to not understanding it? Understanding what? 
Understanding how? And what not and how not? Ugh! 
It is evident by now that scientific or empirical “truths” are nowhere to be spotted in 
this vortex. Though on one hand reserving the right to implicate the world by referring 
to it, on the other hand our “truths” are subject to the misfortune that at the bottom of 
the page no mixing with theoretical truths is acceptable. But doesn’t science proceed 
tracing its way along “theory”? Or is it perhaps by way of “theories”? Where has this 
new freaky dilemma crept out of all of a sudden? 
Unfortunately, the Greek abstract noun θεωρία is chiefly used as capitally (though not 
exclusively) meaning a general overall theoretical outlook on –and methodical mental 
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overview of– a narrower or wider field of human examination, scrutiny, contemplation 
and study. As such, this word is generic and has no plural. Expressions like “the 
foundation of mathematical theory” and “the realm of the theory of law”, or “theory 
and application”, or “theory and practice”, or “this approach may sound good in 
theory”, all fall under this shade of meaning and would sound silly in the plural – 
should someone just attempt to substitute “theories” for “theory” in these expressions. 
Or, looking at the expression “this is true in theory”, we can attest that it is standard, 
whereas “this is true in theories” sounds bizarre. In this pure context, it might even 
sound next to ludicrous to cite an expression like “practical theory”, because it should 
be expected to be accompanied by the extra adjective-noun pairs “theoretical theory”, 
“theoretical practice” and… “practical practice”! 
Therefore, the main focus of the original Greek word θεωρία without plural is not a 
definitive synonym for its derivative Latin loanword theoria coming with plural 
theoriæ; and that in spite the fact that a marginal usage like the Latin one has at times 
been jumping forth even in Greek texts. In literal decorum, the word with a plural 
means individual and diverse viewings or overviews, therefore a more expedient 
proper term in Greek for this parallel line of meaning would be θεώρησις. As for 
organized scientific realistic and/or pragmatic name for the overview of an applied or 
extant field seems to have been devised in Greek somewhere in the flow of ages, 
applicable specifically to the art and science of music. There, strictly speaking, next 
to the general abstract mathematical θεωρία μουσικῆς / theory of music – no such plural 
monstrosity of course as ‘θεωρίαι μουσικῆς’ / ‘theories of music’, as Latin and the 
Western languages keep drifting in their ocean of ambivalence and of ambiguity –, 
Greek on its own means has devised and put to use he ingenuous term θεωρητικά 
μουσικῆς for bodies of features and rules describing and theorizing practices and 
behaviours of (various) musical systems, in a manner of saying: “theoretics” of music. 
As long as this paradigm is not perceived as righteous and does not become more 
generally accepted in all fields and in all languages, and as long as the plural of theory 
exists and is not separately called something else like theoretics, a fundamental 
structural misapprehension will always lurk, confusing epistēmē with 
science(Papageorgiou and Lekkas, 2014), truth with truths and those with reality and 
realities, and all communication will be partially mutually incomprehensible and 
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inconsistent and invalid. Whichever way, the language-induced semantic problem 
lurks and shall keep lurking for as long as the distinction between epistēmē (theōriā) 
and science (“theoretics”) will not be possible in English and in fact in all Western 
languages – at least while using one single word. 
This lack of flexibility is expressed again and again in Latin-derived or Latin-modeled 
languages in cases such as epistēmē vs. scientia, evident in the very grammatical and 
syntactical deep-structural discrepancy between the Western indicative (modus 
indicativus) in juxtaposition to the supposed but nowhere near actual discrepancy to 
Greek definitive, enclisis horistikē (Papageorgiou and Lekkas, 2014). Though 
dictionaries indicate the two as equivalent, the truth is that Greek has no indicative and 
Latin has no definitive, and their misidentification reveals the fundamentally diverging 
nature of these two dominant classical linguistic vehicles. However, that, in its 
entirety, would be the subject for another study. Here, we are merely referring to this 
distinction externally, as an indicator of how this distinction may be relevant to our 
search for truth vs, reality in theory vs. empiricism and the sciences. Yet, since the 
sciences ought to have a theoretical prior, we will now focus on an evaluation of the 
control field that studies truth in its most abstract manifestation, i.e. logic. 
It is, unfortunately, true that elementary symbolic logic treats affirmative and negative 
as sort of symmetric in its theorems. That may be plausible in a special class of cases, 
where sets may be roughly symmetric or on a pretty much one-to-one correspondence, 
as in negative and nonnegative numbers, or even and odd (= non-even) integers, or up 
and non-up (level or down) with respect to a given plane in solid geometry. However 
in most cases the asymmetry is so pronounced (vertebrate and invertebrate animals, 
“us” and “the others”) or huge (rational and non-rational real numbers, here and 
elsewhere, now and not now), that considerations incorporating such experience and 
requiring such techniques should really lean on some kind of inductive reasoning, 
whether an ascending (generalizing) or a descending (specializing / individualizing or 
example-locating) one, notably in contexts invoking the duality of abstract / structural 
cases (i.e. those dealing in supersets and subsets). A typical negation most often makes 
a category that is much wider than its corresponding affirmative, especially if that 
affirmative refers to an element or a singleton (a Boolean distinction woefully absent 
from elementary logic so far). 
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However, there is an inbred problem in the very stratification of logics: elementary 
deductive formal symbolic logic of level 0 (alias our staple statement or propositional 
calculus) cannot really import considerations from basic inductive formal symbolic 
logic of level 1 (alias predicate calculus) without causing a logical cul-de-sac 
impregnated with a necessary definitional and theorematic prōthysteron. 
Thus it would be quite important to stay very much to-the-point, in dealing with 
statements referring to elements, or to singletons, or at most to small well-defined sets 
of cases —excluding, for the sake of argument and for the present elementary limited 
context, inductive statements calling for predicate calculus, which had better be 
examined separately and in a more specialized rigorous fashion to avoid paradoxes. 
To achieve that, we should probably lay down three elementary patterns of inference, 
which can all be handled effectively in rather easy and straightforward ways. Of 
course, we can never be too careful about factually negative (or crypto-negative) 
concepts passing in language as pseudo-affirmative; those “anti-concepts” or, worse, 
“non-concepts”, would only be definable in essence only via a negation of a truly 
definable concept — e.g. odd = non-even = not divisible by 2, or darkness = absence 
of light, i.e. of photons, or prime number, all indirecty definable: not by effectively 
defined sets, but via complements of such sets. Let us bear in mind that, in all cases 
listed below, there is an underlying sequencing of the statements breaking any strict 
symmetry between A and B, grosso modo suggesting that A is some cause or reason 
or given or antecedent or input or starting point, whereas B is some effect or 
consequence or conclusion or output or terminal point or finishing line. 
Primary affirmative deduction, of the form A → B; 
primary negative deduction, of the form ¬A → ¬B; 
primary reduction (ad absurdum), of the dual forms ¬A → B or A → ¬B. 
These three basic forms above can also be further checked by laying down and 
examining their antisymmetric reversions, equivalent to them via standard established 
well-known theorems, formally falling under cases of modus tollens (usable under the 
previously proved understanding that ¬¬A ↔ A and ¬¬B ↔ B): 
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¬B → ¬A: secondary negative anti-deduction as a checking mechanism towards an 
effective validation of a reversed affirmative deduction; 
B → A: secondary affirmative anti-deduction as a checking mechanism towards an 
effective validation of a reversed negative deduction; 
¬B → A or B → ¬A: dual secondary anti-reductions as checking mechanisms towards 
alternative effective validations of reversed reductions. 
So, now, how is negativity as in absence founded logically? Arguing and establishing 
that something does not exist or did not happen or is not X, as the phrasing of an all-
too-common ever-recurring question goes, would probably have to fall under the dual 
pairs of cases numbered 2 and 3b above. Conceivably, a call involving a capitally 
negative concept, trying to serve as a definitive approach to this question, would 
involve a demonstrable identification of i. what consequence B could NOT have 
happened as a result of precedent A not happening (2), and ii. what would necessarily 
have followed as a result of A’s occurrence that would cause failure of effect B to 
surface (3b); then we could double-check by reversion, in fact by wondering what non-
sequitur’s and other paradoxes would or would not have arisen as essential 
consequences to an identifiable cause and/or mechanism A having either occurred (2) 
or evanesced / been impossible to occur (3b), in the unreal case that B had indeed been 
recorded as having happened (but of course hasn’t). 
 
Case study: what are the main causes of gravitational force? 
Gravity is not there in the universe and it is not real. It is not an identifiable entity or 
process; if someone says they see gravity because it can be identified as an observable 
pulsus or an impulsus or a tractio, and think that they have solved the problem, well, 
they haven’t; first of all these fancy Latin words signify an activity (not an entity) 
mobilizing the mechanism of generation and manifestation of “force”, yet are not 
nouns substantive or declarative of force herself, who keeps smiling from without 
stubbornly unsubstantiated like an elusive Roman goddess, and second this does not 
happen in all cases, because, in common treacherous magnetism and electro-
magnetism and in gravity (leaving out nuclear “forces” goddess-forbid), there are no 
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real pulsi or impulsi or tractiones; there is only a propensity to be set to motion (i.e. to 
accelerate), which physicists feel compelled to describe, document and attribute, 
literally or figuratively, and then set their model unfailingly predicting, by all means 
imaginable and at all costs incurable, because that is the nature of their discipline. Still, 
what is there in the universe and what is real and observable and recordable and 
accountable is acceleration, and thence gravity is a physicists’ postulated cause, in a 
supernatural or at least trans-natural frame of mind. And if that has to be documented 
using some other mental imagery, a tautology is a tautology. By baptizing acceleration 
an effect and imagining a cause, one has indeed highlighted force. But, in magnetism, 
the magnet is indeed there in the universe and real. By seeking an analogue of cause 
in asserting a “similarity of effect” as of observed behaviour (whatever that means in 
reality since in theory it is nonsensical either way), one establishes a “totemic” quasi-
magnet “thing”, describes it by invoking mathematical formulas (which, by the way, 
are mathematics, not physics, therefore do not essentially mean a thing), looks for it 
and does not or cannot find it. Thus, gravity is an apocalyptic deity manifested so and 
so and clad in a costume of a field, where force is in the field and force is the field, 
therefore force is in itself, as though both box and content, an ambit of fancy equations, 
mathematically speaking, immaterial and abstract “causes” towards material and 
concrete effects: a semantic paradox. And, if someone believes that this description 
laid out here is unfair, we would like to see the causes invoked as entities or as 
processes or both. And if the counterargument is offered by someone saying “here 
they are”, yet pointing their finger at the effect and saying that this is it because it is 
terminal evidence of the cause that they are invoking, this will just not do. When the 
ancient Greeks were asking why earthquakes occur and the priests were answering 
“Titan Enceladus”, showing volcanic vapours as “proof” of the Titan’s breath, that 
was circularly self-asserting mythology. 
In the case of gravity, then, what is real and observable directly is acceleration; gravity, 
on the contrary, is supposed to be a “cause” of acceleration. This is what exists in 
nature and is real and is apt to beget a magnitude is objects and processes and 
behaviours directly observed; it is not a horizon of theological or spirit-world 
postulated causes and models, suspected or potentially deemed to be detectable 
indirectly through effects. A cause may be a model, a belief or a figment of the 
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imagination. None of these are acceptable as mathematics. One may indeed argue that 
the cause is an equation, another one may argue that the “real cause” of gravity is the 
wisdom of the biblical God or Zeus or Shakti. Textbook gravity is no more 
authoritative than these. It might be much better, then, to stick to the description of 
phenomena, stick to mere behaviour-describing analyses and spare everybody the 
attempts to detect would-be causes; hypotheses non fingo, in other words. In order to 
have a record of acceleration, there is no need of anything, except a measure and a 
description and a timer. Protons are stuck together and that is enough said. Maybe 
physicists would be better off without mechanistic and theist powers. 
In mathematics, which is the foundation of all science (methodologically at least), in 
lack of a physical object or process, to have a cause or, worse, the cause as reflecting 
or “causing” an effect has a requirement, already hinted at previously: to rigorously 
theoretically show, by logical equivalence, that the cause invoked is the only cause 
possible for the particular effect; that is the only rigorous way of securely correlating 
cause to effect and going from the latter (effect) to the former (cause). There is a huge 
complication in proof schemes like this, connected to the underlying inductive (i.e. 
predicate) negativity of the statement as productively inferentially connected to the 
examples cited, which, on top of that, are already argued for by using the same pattern 
as the one they are trying to uphold; thus the approach blackmails the output towards 
reflecting the input, and that is logically foul. Where is the effect of confirmation bias 
in all this and where is it not? And what does Logical Positivism have to say here? 
And what about scientific empirical realism? 
This brings us all too conveniently to summing up the discussion of force. A “force” 
is not an entity. Taking the first example (there are others), in Newtonian terms, 
logically starting at the top, if we have an object of mass m, which we observe 
accelerating at acceleration a, we define a magnitude called force, F, regardless of 
what it might be or of what be “causing” it (springs, externally applied actions of pull, 
impulse or traction, distant influence, geometry etc.), which, in equaling the metric 
and/or [scalar times vector] product (ma), is just only a measure of propensity to 
accelerate, given a mass. And all that regardless of intrinsic  pulsus or impulsus or 
tractio, which are material agents of the would-be “force”; and, worse, also regardless 
of magnetism or electromagnetism or the strong and weak sub-atomic “forces” which 
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alas aren’t, but they are a field operating as a field operating in a field, i.e. in itself. 
What that means is left to the eye of the beholder. And nothing has even been said 
about angular acceleration, which, unlike linear acceleration, has nothing like angular 
force generating it; rejection of the “non-existent” (i.e. that which physics can claim 
to be able to do its job without, i.e. simply usage-wise redundant), or a-symmetrical 
breech in the uniformity and harmony of conceptualization and argumentation? And, 
when some (not all) mathematicians start uttering this skepticism, they are often 
indignantly told to shut their mouths, because they do not understand the first thing 
about physics, and to go get a BS in physics and then ask again. Ask whom about 
what? Is this addressed to the leading experts in the field, who, when asked for 
explanations, unequivocally end up with one of the three following alternative 
answers: “The truth is that we don’t really know or we don’t really understand or we 
can’t really tell”. About the rest, OK, they are pretty confident. And their argument is 
sheets upon sheets of mathematics.  
The magnetic force of the magnet is nothing “real”; it is a feeling or idea one gets upon 
seeing objects accelerating towards the magnet. The field is something we have yet to 
see. Then one may wonder if there are causes responsible for that acceleration and for 
the differentiation from other masses that don’t accelerate to it. There may be an 
essential quest about the nature of that propensity there, but that is beside the measure 
of the propensity itself. Some things look like they are subject to an analogue of 
attraction or pull on a surface of water, which may be “due” to a vortex; the vortex 
itself is a phenomenon though. 
According to physics, inertial motion is a phenomenon connected to anything from no 
force to one zillion forces “canceling out”. No acceleration, no force, things are simple. 
The strong force is “attractive” or “repulsive” according to the accelerations we 
measure, then it becomes a graph reflecting observation, then it “must be a cause” in 
the sense of conflicting behaviours, then the graph must become nature, then a cause 
must be sought for it, then three particles are invented that no one has ever seen or will 
ever see, then these particles are objects etc. etc. This is a classic case of subjectivist 
projection and a forcing of make-believe idea on phenomenon. 
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What if another model works better, say a vortex-type one? What if there are three 
gravities instead of one? Why? Because, say, somebody said so and because they have 
managed to show that it works… as well… better... In epistēmē, it is totally indifferent 
if somebody said so and we think that the “it works” argument is disgraceful, and the 
rest is a scenario of biased self-affirming self-trapping assumptions, interpretations 
and applications that convince whomever they convince; pretty much like a 
specialized custom-tailored mythology. 
What if someone, tomorrow, came up with a new set of equations for gravities, and 
then a new equation for wave-matter? Don’t galaxies look pretty much like dirty suds 
sucked up by the dark hole of a sink as they spin? If gravity is contingent on the 
reciprocal of the square of distance, why do galaxies have two (2) spiral arms coiled 
around and separated by two (2) spirally coiled voids? Why are the spiral arms not 
three (3), four (4), five (5) or six (6)? What “gravity” is it that keeps them apart and 
prevents them from merging into rings? What if the observed voids are better for a 
galaxy than the observed “arms”? Why are voids in cosmic rings equidistant? Where, 
and how, do phase spaces come in? 
What if, tomorrow, someone were to document or offer a wonderful simple 
explanation that the simple harmonic oscillation is a type of motion that is not overall 
(externally) accelerating but is naturally inherently inertial, and that no “(extra) force” 
is required to intermediately come and keep coming into the picture towards 
accounting for its functions? What if it were then to be established that, consequently, 
the building blocks of matter and energy do not operate via some invoked force – 
which is an external cause, or via some field, which is a self-external and self-internal 
intrinsic / environmental cause-and-effect-and-vice-versa external / internal cause 
within itself without itself –, but if it turned out that all can be re-explained via inertial 
simple harmonic oscillations, basic algebraic geometrically affine periodicity, all 
ultimately subject to Fourier’s theorem? As if all this is not in the equations already, 
and as if Albert Einstein did not make a point of telling us that the crash test of 
understanding a theory is telling it simply; and as if someone not reciting the material 
in the way that the mainstream scientific establishment wants it “does not understand 
it and must study contemporary science to get it”? If so, then, what about the statement 
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lurking at the other end of this labyrinth, the clichés of the kind “the truth of the matter 
is that we do not understand”? Is this not a truth? If it is not, then what is it? 
 
6. Conclusions 
It could not hurt to bear all this in mind, especially as we are dealing with the higher 
and more exalted fields of human experience and thought in laying out, appraising and 
judging the living juices of civilization. People ask all kinds of questions, in diverse 
ways, and give all kinds of answers. What does the human mind have to go by? Given 
the fundamental dichotomy of speech and thought between affirmative and negative, 
endowed with a fundamental lack of symmetry between them, if there is no way to 
reach a conclusion in this lurking eulogy of parallel monologues and layout of 
coexistent clashing sentences and verdicts, where is the classical logical feeling that if 
two people disagree at least one of them is wrong? Where are the axioms of elementary 
logic? Where is the main reason and motive for us to be engaging in epistēmē and 
science? Don’t we go through all this trouble motivated in order to reach conclusions? 
Or do we accept the trouble for a reason other than in order to reach them? or in order 
not to reach them? Why do we even bother, then? What are we? Some kind of 
Sisyphean masochists? 
Because, at the bottom of the page(s), and at the end of the day(s), if affirmative and 
negative are not symmetric (which of course they are not), 
i. we may be answering whatever we are answering about intuitive and 
nonintuitive logics, given that perhaps a lot of people don’t really desire a logic 
that is strictly intuitive and common-sensical; but, sanely speaking, who wants 
a “logic” that is totally definitively and shall remain forever non-intuitive and 
non-sensical? who, for whom, when and for what? 
ii. we may be answering whatever we are answering about applied and applicable 
mathematics and epistemonic principle and scientific theory, given that 
perhaps a lot of people are not dying for an abstract mathematical theory that 
is strictly referential and applicable; but, sanely speaking, what kind of “sicko” 
wants a mathematical realm that is totally ultimately and forever definitively 
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inapplicable to anything conceivable and shall remain forever non-intuitive 
and non-sensical and irrelevant to anything whatsoever? who, for whom, when 
and for what? 
The authors of this paper have no answer to give to these last questions. Maybe 
someone else has. Maybe a worthy intellectual descendant of Aristophanes or of 
Molière… 
 
PS 
And then there came quanta, and then quanta interfered and meddled in gravity, and 
then there was quantum gravity. And then came the next day of creation. 
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